These two responsibilities-robustly defending European peace and prudently avoiding military escalation with Russia-will not necessarily be compatible. All sides would have to consider the potential of nuclear-armed adversaries in direct confrontation. and European leaders would face the dual challenge of rethinking European security and of not being drawn into a larger war with Russia. If Russia gains control of Ukraine or manages to destabilize it on a major scale, a new era for the United States and for Europe will begin. But if the KremlinвЂ™s calculus is right, as in the end it was in Syria, then the United States and Europe should also be prepared for an eventuality other than quagmire. Of course, Russia might simply prolong the current crisis without invading or find some palatable way to disengage. And as Moscow sees it, a victory in Ukraine might well be within reach. The Russian leadership is taking on more risks, and above the fray of day-to-day politics, Putin is on a historic mission to solidify RussiaвЂ™s leverage in Ukraine (as he has recently in Belarus and Kazakhstan). Nevertheless, PutinвЂ™s cost-benefit analysis seems to favor upending the European status quo. According to this view, Russia would be trapped in a disaster of its own making. At the same time, it could bring NATO troops closer to RussiaвЂ™s borders, leaving Russia to fight a Ukrainian resistance for years to come. Along with undermining PutinвЂ™s support among the Russian elite, who would suffer personally from the ensuing tensions with Europe, a war could endanger RussiaвЂ™s economy and alienate the public. The United States has estimated as many as 50,000 civilian casualties. In a rational cost-benefit analysis, the thinking goes, the price of a full-scale war in Ukraine would be punishingly high for the Kremlin and would entail significant bloodshed. On February 11, British Minister of State for Europe James Cleverly predicted that a wider war in Ukraine вЂњwould be a quagmireвЂќ for Russia. And once again, many analysts are warning of dire consequences for the aggressor. In the surreal winter of 2021вЂ“22, the United States and Europe are once again contemplating a major Russian military intervention, this time in Europe itself. In Syria, what the Obama administration failed to anticipate was the possibility that RussiaвЂ™s intervention would succeed. Instead, Moscow has amassed greater regional clout, from Israel to Libya, and retained a loyal partner in Assad for RussiaвЂ™s power projection. It kept costs and casualties sustainable. Russia changed the course of the war, saving Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from impending defeat, and then translated military force into diplomatic leverage. Syria did not end up as a quagmire for Putin. Syria would be RussiaвЂ™s Vietnam or PutinвЂ™s Afghanistan, a grievous mistake that would eventually rebound against Russian interests.

Out of frustration, then President Barack Obama claimed that Syria would become a вЂњquagmireвЂќ for Russia and Russian President Vladimir Putin. When Russia joined the ongoing civil war in Syria, in the summer of 2015, it shocked the United States and its partners.

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